Which rules for aggregating judgments on logically connected propositions are manipulable and which not? In this paper, we introduce a preference-free concept of non-manipulability and contrast it with a preference-theoretic concept of strategy-proofness. We characterize all non-manipulable and all strategy-proof judgment aggregation rules and prove an impossibility theorem similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. We also discuss weaker forms of nonmanipulability and strategy-proofness. Comparing two frequently discussed aggregation rules, we show that "conclusion-based voting" is less vulnerable to manipulation than "premisebased voting", which is strategy-proof only for "reason-oriented"individuals. Surprisingly, for "outcome-oriented"individuals, the two rules are strategically equivalent, generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results introduce game-theoretic considerations into judgment aggregation and have implications for debates on deliberative democracy.
Introduction
How can a group of individuals aggregate their individual judgments (beliefs, opinions) on some logically connected propositions into collective judgments on these propositions? In particular, how can a group do this under conditions of pluralism, i.e., when individuals disagree on the propositions in question? This problem -judgment aggregation -is discussed in a growing literature in philosophy, economics and political science and generalizes earlier problems of social choice, notably preference aggregation in the Condorcet-Arrow tradition. 2 The problem arises in many di¤er-ent decision making bodies, ranging from legislative committees and multi-member courts to expert advisory panels and monetary policy committees of a central bank.
Judgment aggregation is often illustrated by a paradox: the discursive (or doctrinal ) paradox (Kornhauser and Sager 1986; Pettit 2001; Brennan 2001) . To illustrate, suppose a university committee responsible for a tenure decision has to make 1 F. Dietrich, Dept. of Quant. Econ., Univ. of Maastricht, P.O. Box 616, 6200 MD Maastricht, NL.
collective judgments on three propositions: 3 a: The candidate is good at teaching.
b:
The candidate is good at research. c: The candidate deserves tenure.
According to the university's rules, c (the "conclusion") is true if and only if a and b (the "premises") are both true, formally c $ (a^b) (the "connection rule").
Suppose the committee has three members with judgments as shown in Table 1 . If the committee takes a majority vote on each proposition, then a and b are each accepted and yet c is rejected (each by two thirds), despite the (unanimous)
acceptance of c $ (a^b). The discursive paradox shows that judgment aggregation by propositionwise majority voting may lead to inconsistent collective judgments, just as Condorcet's paradox shows that preference aggregation by pairwise majority voting may lead to intransitive collective preferences.
In response to the discursive paradox, two aggregation rules have been proposed to avoid such inconsistencies (e.g., Pettit 2001; Chapman 1998 Chapman , 2002 Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006) . Under premise-based voting, majority votes are taken on a and b (the premises), but not on c (the conclusion), and the collective judgment on c is derived using the connection rule c $ (a^b): in Table 1 , a, b and c are all accepted. Premise-based voting captures the deliberative democratic idea that collective decisions on outcomes should be made on the basis of collectively decided reasons.
Here reasoning is "collectivized", as Pettit (2001) describes it. Under conclusion-based voting, a majority vote is taken only on c, and no collective judgments are made on a or b: in Table 1 , c is rejected and other propositions are left undecided. Conclusionbased voting captures the minimal liberal idea that collective decisions should be made only on (practical) outcomes and that the reasons behind such decisions should remain private. Here collective decisions are "incompletely theorized" in Sunstein's (1994) terms. (For a comparison between minimal liberal and comprehensive deliberative approaches to decision making, see List 2006.) Abstracting from the discursive dilemma, Pettit (2002, 2004) have formalized judgment aggregation and proved that no judgment aggregation rule ensuring consistency can satisfy some conditions inspired by Arrow's conditions on preference aggregation. This impossibility result has been strengthened and extended by Pauly and van Hees (2006; see also van Hees 2007), Dietrich (2006) , Gärdenfors (2006) and Dietrich and List (2007) . Drawing on the model of "property spaces", Nehring and Puppe (2002, 2005) have o¤ered the …rst characterizations of agendas of propositions for which impossibility results hold (for a subsequent contribution, see Dokow and Holzman 2005) . Possibility results have been obtained by List (2003 List ( , 2004 , Pigozzi (2006) and Osherson and Vardi (forthcoming) . Dietrich (2007) has developed an extension of the judgment aggregation model to richer logical languages for expressing
propositions, which we use in this paper. Related bodies of literature include those on abstract aggregation theory (Wilson 1975) 4 and on belief merging in computer science (Konieczny and Pino-Perez 2002) .
But one important question has received little attention in the literature on judgment aggregation: Which aggregation rules are manipulable by strategic voting and which are strategy-proof? The answer is not obvious, as strategy-proofness in the familiar sense in economics is a preference-theoretic concept and preferences are not primitives of judgment aggregation models. Yet the question matters for the design and implementation of an aggregation rule in a collective decision making body such as in the examples above. Ideally, we would like to …nd aggregation rules that lead individuals to reveal their judgments truthfully. Indeed, if an aggregation rule captures the normatively desirable functional relation between individual and collective judgments, then truthful revelation of these individual judgments (which are typically private information) is crucial for the (direct) implementation of that functional relation. 5 In this paper, we address this question. We …rst introduce a simple condition of non-manipulability and characterize the class of non-manipulable judgment aggregation rules. We then show that, under certain motivational assumptions about 4 Wilson's (1975) aggregation problem, where a group has to form yes/no views on several issues based on individual views on them (subject to feasibility constraints), can be represented in judgment aggregation. Unlike judgment aggregation, Wilson's model cannot fully generally represent logical entailment: its primitive is a consistency (feasibility) notion, from which an entailment relation can be retrieved only for certain logical languages (Dietrich 2007) . 5 A functional relation between individual and collective judgments could be deemed normatively desirable for a variety of reasons, such as epistemic or democratic legitimacy goals. The axiomatic approach to social choice theory translates these goals into formal requirements on aggregation.
individuals, our condition is equivalent to a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition similar to the one introduced by Gibbard (1973) and Satterthwaite (1975) for preference aggregation. 6 Our characterization of non-manipulable aggregation rules then yields a characterization of strategy-proof aggregation rules. The relevant motivational assumptions hold if agents want the group to make collective judgments that match their own individual judgments (e.g., want the group to make
judgments that match what they consider the truth). In many other cases, such as that of "reason-oriented" individuals (as de…ned in Section 5), non-manipulability and strategy-proofness may come signi…cantly apart.
By introducing both a non-game-theoretic condition of non-manipulability and a game-theoretic condition of strategy-proofness, we are able to distinguish between opportunities for manipulation (which depend only on the aggregation rule in question) and incentives for manipulation (which depend also on the motivations of the decision-makers).
We prove that, for a general class of aggregation problems including the tenure example above, there exists no non-manipulable judgment aggregation rule satisfying universal domain and some other mild conditions, an impossibility result similar to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on preference aggregation. Subsequently, we identify various ways to avoid the impossibility result. We also show that our default conditions of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness fall into general families of conditions and discuss other conditions in these families. In the case of strategyproofness, these conditions correspond to di¤erent motivational assumptions about the decision makers. In the tenure example, conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof in a strong sense, but produces no collective judgments on the premises. Premisebased voting satis…es only the weaker condition of strategy-proofness for "reasonoriented" individuals. Surprisingly, although premise-and conclusion-based voting are regarded in the literature as two diametrically opposed aggregation rules, they are strategically equivalent if individuals are "outcome-oriented", generating identical judgments in equilibrium. Our results not only introduce game-theoretic considerations into the theory of judgment aggregation, but they are also relevant to debates on democratic theory as premise-based voting has been advocated, and conclusion-based voting rejected, by proponents of deliberative democracy (Pettit 2001) .
There is, of course, a related literature on manipulability and strategy-proofness in preference aggregation, following Gibbard's and Satterthwaite's classic contribu-6 Our de…nition of strategy-proofness in judgment aggregation draws on List (2002b List ( , 2004 , where su¢ cient conditions for strategy-proofness in (sequential) judgment aggregation are given.
tions (e.g., Taylor 2002 Taylor , 2005 Saporiti and Thomé 2005) . An important branch of this literature, from which several corollaries for judgment aggregation can be derived, has considered preference aggregation over options that are vectors of binary properties (Barberà et al. 1993 (Barberà et al. , 1997 Nehring and Puppe 2002) . A parallel to judgment aggregation can be drawn by identifying propositions with properties; a disanalogy lies in the structure of the informational input to the aggregation rule.
While judgment aggregation rules collect a single judgment set from each individual (expressed in a possibly rich logical language), preference aggregation rules collect an entire preference ordering over vectors of properties. Whether or not an individual's most-preferred vector of properties (in preference aggregation) can be identi…ed with her judgment set (in judgment aggregation) depends precisely on the motivational assumptions we make about this individual.
Another important related literature is that on the paradox of multiple elections (Brams et al. 1997 (Brams et al. , 1998 Kelly 1989) . Here a group also aggregates individual votes on multiple propositions, and the winning combination can be one that no voter individually endorses. However, given the di¤erent focus of that work, the propositions in question are not explicitly modelled as logically interconnected as in our present model of judgment aggregation. The formal proofs of all the results reported in the main text are given in the Appendix.
The basic model
We consider a group of individuals N = f1; 2; : : : ; ng, where n 2. 7 The group has to make collective judgments on logically connected propositions.
Representing propositions in formal logic
Propositions are represented in a logical language, de…ned by two components: a non-empty set L of formal expressions representing propositions; the language has a negation symbol : ("not"), where for each proposition p in L, its negation :p is also contained in L.
an entailment relation , where, for each set of propositions A L and each proposition p 2 L, A p is read as "A logically entails p". 8
7 Although no discursive paradox arises for n = 2, our results below still hold: Under Theorem 2's other conditions, non-manipulability requires a dictatorship of one of the two individuals. The unanimity rule, while also non-manipulable, violates completeness of collective judgments.
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can be interpreted either as semantic entailment or as syntactic derivability (usually denoted ). The two interpretations give rise to semantic or syntactic notions of rationality, respectively.
We call a set of propositions A L inconsistent if A p and A :p for some p 2 L, and consistent otherwise. We require the logical language to have certain minimal properties (Dietrich 2007; Dietrich and List 2007a) . 9
The most familiar logical language is (classical) propositional logic, containing a given set of atomic propositions a, b, c, ..., such as the propositions about the candidate's teaching, research and tenure in the example above, and compound propositions with the logical connectives : ("not"),^("and"), _ ("or"), ! ("if-then"), $ ("if and only if"), such as the connection rule c $ (a^b) in the tenure example. 10 Examples of valid logical entailments in propositional logic are fa; a ! bg b ("modus ponens"), fa ! b; :bg :a ("modus tollens"), whereas the entailment fa _ bg a is not valid. Examples of consistent sets are fa; a _ bg, f:a; :b; a ! bg, and examples of inconsistent ones are fa; :ag, fa; a ! b; :bg and fa; b; c $ (a^b); :cg.
We use classical propositional logic in our examples, but our results also hold for other, more expressive logical languages such as the following: predicate logic, which includes relation symbols and the quanti…ers "there exists ..." and "for all ..."; modal logic, which includes the operators "it's necessary that ..."
and "it's possible that ..."; deontic logic, which includes the operators "it's permissible that ..."
and "it's obligatory that ..."; conditional logic, which allows the expression of counterfactual or subjunctive conditionals. Many di¤erent propositions that might be considered by a multi-member decision making body (ranging from legislative committees to expert panels) can be formally represented in an appropriate such language. Crucially, a logical language allows us to capture the fact that, in many decision problems, di¤erent propositions, such as the reasons for a particular tenure outcome and the resulting outcome itself, are mutually interconnected. 
We drop brackets when there is no ambiguity. Entailment ( ) is de…ned standardly.
The agenda
The agenda is the set of propositions on which judgments are to be made; it is a non-empty subset X L, where X is a union of proposition-negation pairs fp; :pg (with p not a negated proposition Finally, we can also represent standard preference aggregation problems within our model. Here we use a predicate logic with a set of constants K representing options (jKj 3) and a two-place predicate R representing preferences, where, for any x; y 2 K, the proposition xRy is interpreted as "x is preferable to y". Now the preference agenda is the set X = fxRy : x; y 2 Kg +neg (Dietrich and List 2007a) . 13 The nature of a judgment aggregation problem depends on what propositions are contained in the agenda and how they are interconnected. Our main characterization theorem holds for any agenda of propositions. Our main impossibility theorem holds for a large class of agendas, de…ned below. We also discuss applications to the important cases of conjunctive and disjunctive agendas.
1 1 Hereafter, when we write :p and p is already of the form :q, we mean q (rather than ::q). 1 2 Although we here interpret connection rules c $ (a1^ ^a k ) as material biimplications, one may prefer to interpret them as subjunctive biimplications (in a conditional logic). This changes the logical relations within conjunctive agendas: more judgment sets are consistent, including f:a1; :::; :a k ; :c; :(c $ (a1^ ^a k ))g. As a result, our impossibility results (Theorems 2-3 and
Corollary 2) do not apply to conjunctive agendas in the revised sense; instead, we obtain stronger possibility results. Analogous remarks hold for disjunctive agendas. See Dietrich (forthcoming). 1 3 The entailment relation in this logical language is de…ned by A p if and only if A [ Z entails p in the standard sense of predicate logic, where Z is the set of rationality conditions on preferences
Individual and collective judgments
Each individual i's judgment set is a subset A i X, where p 2 A i means that individual i accepts proposition p. As the agenda typically contains both atomic propositions and compound ones, our de…nition of a judgment set captures the fact that an individual makes judgments both on free-standing atomic propositions and on their interconnections; and di¤erent individuals may disagree with each other on both kinds of propositions.
A judgment set A i is consistent if it is a consistent set of propositions as de…ned for the logic; A i is complete if it contains a member of each proposition-negation pair p; :p 2 X. A pro…le (of individual judgment sets) is an n-tuple (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ).
A (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to each admissible pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) a collective judgment set F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) = A X, where p 2 A means that the group accepts proposition p. The set of admissible pro…les is called the domain of F , denoted Domain(F ). Several results below require the following.
Universal Domain. Domain(F ) is the set of all possible pro…les of consistent and complete individual judgment sets.
Examples of aggregation rules
We give four important examples of aggregation rules satisfying universal domain, as just introduced. The …rst two rules are de…ned for any agenda, the last two only for conjunctive (or disjunctive) agendas (the present de…nitions are simpli…ed, but a generalization is possible).
Propositionwise majority voting.
For each (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ), F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) is the set of all propositions p 2 X such that more individuals i have
Premise-based voting. For each (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ), F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) is the set containing any premise a j if and only if more i have a j 2 A i than a j = 2 A i , the connection rule c $ (a 1^ ^a k ), the conclusion c if and only if a j 2 F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) for all premises a j , any negated proposition :p if and only if p = 2 F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ). 14 1 4 For a disjunctive agenda, replace "c $ (a1^ ^a k )" with "c $ (a1 _ _ a k )" and "for all premises aj" with "for some premise aj".
Here votes are taken only on each premise, and the conclusion is decided by using an exogenously given connection rule.
only the negation of the conclusion :c otherwise. Here a vote is taken only on the conclusion, and no collective judgments are made on other propositions.
Dictatorships and premise-based voting always generate consistent and complete collective judgments; propositionwise majority voting sometimes generates inconsistent ones (recall Table 1 ), and conclusion-based voting always generates incomplete ones (no judgments on the premises).
In debates on the discursive paradox and democratic theory, several arguments have been o¤ered for the superiority of premise-based voting over conclusion-based voting. One such argument draws on a deliberative conception of democracy, which emphasizes that collective decisions on conclusions should follow from collectively decided premises (Pettit 2001; Chapman 2002) . A second argument draws on the Condorcet jury theorem. If all the propositions are factually true or false and each individual has a probability greater than 1/2 of judging each premise correctly, then, under certain probabilistic independence assumptions, premise-based voting has a higher probability of producing a correct collective judgment on the conclusion than conclusion-based voting (Grofman 1985; Bovens and Rabinowicz 2006; List 2005 List , 2006 ). Here we show that, with regard to strategic manipulability, premise-based voting performs worse than conclusion-based voting.
Non-manipulability
When can an aggregation rule be manipulated by strategic voting? We …rst introduce a new condition of non-manipulability, not yet game-theoretic. Below we prove that, under certain motivational assumptions about the individuals, our non-manipulability condition is equivalent to a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition. We also notice that non-manipulability and strategy-proofness may sometimes come apart.
An example
To give a simple example, we use the language of incentives to manipulate, although our subsequent formal analysis focuses on underlying opportunities for manipulation;
we return to incentives formally in Section 4. Recall the pro…le in Table 1 . Suppose, for the moment, that the three committee members each care only about reaching a collective judgment on the conclusion (c) that agrees with their own individual judgments on the conclusion, and that they do not care about the collective judgments on the premises. What matters to them is the …nal tenure decision, not the underlying reasons; they are "outcome-oriented", as de…ned precisely later.
Suppose …rst the committee uses conclusion-based voting; a vote is taken only on c. Then, clearly, no committee member has an incentive to express an untruthful judgment on c. Individual 1, who wants the committee to accept c, has no incentive to vote against c. Individuals 2 and 3, who want the committee to reject c, have no incentive to vote in favour of c. Table 1 , voting untruthfully against both a and b weakly dominates voting truthfully for individuals 2 and 3.) Ferejohn (2003) has made this observation informally.
A non-manipulability condition
To formalize these observations, some de…nitions are needed. We say that one judgment set, A, agrees with another, A , on a proposition p 2 X if either both or none of A and A contains p; A disagrees with A on p otherwise. Two pro…les are i-variants of each other if they coincide for all individuals except possibly i.
An aggregation rule F is manipulable at the pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) by individual i on proposition p 2 X if A i disagrees with F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) on p, but A i agrees with F (A 1 ; : : : ; A i ; : : : ; A n ) on p for some i-variant (A 1 ; : : : ; A i ; : : : ; A n ) 2
Domain(F ).
For example, at the pro…le in Table 1 Manipulability thus de…ned is the existence of an opportunity for some individual(s) to manipulate the collective judgment(s) on some proposition(s) by expressing untruthful individual judgments (perhaps on other propositions). The question of when such opportunities for manipulation translate into incentives for manipulation is a separate question. Whether a rational individual will act on a particular opportunity for manipulation depends on the individual's precise motivation and particularly on how much he or she cares about the various propositions involved in a possible act of manipulation. To illustrate, in our example above, we have assumed that individuals care only about the …nal tenure decision, implying that they do indeed have incentives to act on their opportunities for manipulation. We discuss this issue in detail when we introduce preferences over judgment sets below.
Our de…nition of manipulability leads to a corresponding de…nition of non-manipulability. Let Y X.
Non-manipulability on Y . implies non-manipulability on Y 1 . If we refer just to "non-manipulability", without adding "on Y ", then we mean the default case Y = X.
A characterization result
When is a judgment aggregation rule non-manipulable? We now characterize the class of non-manipulable aggregation rules in terms of an independence condition and a monotonicity condition. Let Y X. Again, we have de…ned families of conditions. If we refer just to "independence" or "(weak) monotonicity", without adding "on Y ", then we mean the default case
Theorem 1 Let X be any agenda. For each Y X, if F satis…es universal domain, the following conditions are equivalent:
(ii) F is independent on Y and monotonic on Y ;
(iii) F is independent on Y and weakly monotonic on Y . Without a domain assumption (e.g., for a subdomain of the universal domain),
(ii) and (iii) are equivalent, and each implies (i). 15 No assumption on the consistency or completeness of collective judgments is needed. The result can be seen as a preference-free analogue in judgment aggregation of a classic characterization of strategy-proof preference aggregation rules by Barberà et al. (1993) .
In the case of a conjunctive (or disjunctive) agenda, conclusion-based voting is independent and monotonic, hence non-manipulable; premise-based voting is not independent, hence manipulable. But on the set of premises Y = fa 1 ; : : : ; a k g +neg premise-based voting is independent and monotonic (as premise-based voting on those premises is simply equivalent to propositionwise majority voting), and hence it is non-manipulable on Y .
An impossibility result
Ideally, we want to achieve non-manipulability simpliciter and not just on some subset of the agenda. Conclusion-based voting is non-manipulable in this strong sense, but generates incomplete collective judgments. Are there any non-manipulable aggregation rules that generate consistent and complete collective judgments? We now show that, for a general class of agendas, including the agenda in the tenure example above, all non-manipulable aggregation rules satisfying some mild conditions are dictatorial.
To de…ne this class of agendas, we de…ne the notion of path-connectedness, a variant of the notion of total-blockedness introduced by Nehring and Puppe (2002) (originally in the model of "property spaces"). 16 Informally, an agenda of propositions under consideration is path-connected if any two propositions in the agenda are logically connected with each other, either directly or indirectly, via a sequence of (conditional) logical entailments.
Formally, proposition p conditionally entails proposition q if fp; :qg [ Y is inconsistent for some Y X consistent with p and with :q. An agenda X is path-connected if, for all contingent 17 propositions p; q 2 X, there is a sequence p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p k 2 X (of length k 1) with p = p 1 and q = p k such that p 1 conditionally entails p 2 ; p 2 conditionally entails p 3 ; :::; p k 1 conditionally entails p k . The class of path-connected agendas includes conjunctive and disjunctive agendas (see the Appendix) and the preference agenda (Nehring 2003; Dietrich and List 2007a) , which can be used to represent Condorcet-Arrow preference aggregation problems.
Consider the following conditions on an aggregation rule in addition to universal domain.
Collective Rationality. For any pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ), F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n )
is consistent and complete. 18 1 6 For a compact logic, path-connectedness is equivalent to total blockedness; in the general case, path-connectedness is weaker. 1 7 We call a proposition p 2 L contingent if both fpg and f:pg are consistent. 1 8 Although completeness is conventionally called a rationality requirement, one may consider con-Responsiveness. For any contingent proposition p 2 X, there exist two pro…les (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ), (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) such that p 2 F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) and p = 2 F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ).
Theorem 2 For a path-connected agenda X (e.g., a conjunctive, disjunctive or preference agenda), an aggregation rule F satis…es universal domain, collective rationality, responsiveness and non-manipulability if and only if F is a dictatorship of some individual.
For the important case of compact logical languages, this result also follows from (Gibbard 1973; Satterthwaite 1975 ). Below we restate Theorem 2 using a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition.
In the special case of the preference agenda, however, there is an interesting disanalogy between Theorem 2 and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem. As a collectively rational judgment aggregation rule for the preference agenda represents an Arrowian social welfare function, Theorem 2 establishes an impossibility result on the non-manipulability of social welfare functions (generating orderings as in Arrow's framework) as opposed to social choice functions (generating winning options as in the Gibbard-Satterthwaite framework); for a related result, see Bossert and Storcken (1992) .
If the agenda is not path-connected, then there may exist non-dictatorial aggregation rules satisfying all of Theorem 2's conditions; examples of such agendas are not only trivial agendas (containing a single proposition-negation pair or several logically independent such pairs), but also agendas involving only conditionals, including the simple example X = fa; b; a ! bg +neg (Dietrich forthcoming).
By contrast, for atomically closed or atomic agendas, special cases of path-connected agendas with very rich logical connections, an even stronger impossibility result holds, in which Theorem 2's responsiveness condition is signi…cantly weakened. 20 sistency more important. But if the agenda includes all those propositions on which collective judgments are (practically) required, completeness seems reasonable. Below we discuss relaxing it. 1 9 Nehring and Puppe's result implies that the theorem's agenda assumption is maximally weak. 2 0 Agenda X is atomically closed if (i) X belongs to classical propositional logic, (ii) if an atomic proposition a occurs in some p 2 X then a 2 X, and (iii) for any atomic propositions a; b 2 X, we 
Avoiding the impossibility result
To …nd non-manipulable and non-dictatorial aggregation rules, we must relax at least one condition in Theorems 2 or 3. Non-responsive rules are usually unattractive. Permitting inconsistent collective judgments also seems unattractive. But the following may sometimes be defensible. unidimensional alignment (List 2003) . 21 Informally, unidimensional alignment requires that the individuals can be aligned from left to right (under any interpretation of "left" and "right") such that, for each proposition on the agenda, the individuals accepting the proposition are either exclusively to the left, or exclusively to the right, of those rejecting it. This structure condition captures a shared unidimensional conceptualization of the decision problem by the decision-makers. In debates on deliberative democracy, it is sometimes hypothesized that group deliberation may reduce disagreement so as to bring about such a shared unidimensional conceptualization (Miller 1992; Dryzek and List 2003) , sometimes also described as a "meta-consensus" (List 2002a ).
Strategy-proofness
Non-manipulability is not yet a game-theoretic concept. We now de…ne strategyproofness, a game-theoretic concept that depends on individual preferences (over judgment sets held by the group). We identify assumptions on individual preferences that render strategy-proofness equivalent to non-manipulability and discuss the plausibility of these assumptions.
Preference relations over judgment sets
We interpret a judgment aggregation problem as a game with n players (the individuals). 22 The game form is given by the aggregation rule: each individual's possible actions are the di¤erent judgment sets the individual can submit to the aggregation rule (which may or may not coincide with the individual's true judgment set); the outcomes are the collective judgment sets generated by the aggregation rule.
To specify the game fully, we assume that each individual, in addition to holding a true judgment set A i , also has a preference relation % i over all possible outcomes of the game, i.e., over all possible collective judgment sets of the form A X. For any two judgment sets, A; B X, A % i B means that individual i weakly prefers the group to endorse A as the collective judgment set rather than B. We assume that % i is re ‡exive and transitive, but do not require it to be complete. 23 Individuals need 2 1 For a related result on preference aggregation, see Saporiti and Thomé (2005) . 2 2 For an earlier version of this game-theoretic interpretation of judgment aggregation, the notion of closeness-respecting preferences over judgment sets, and a su¢ cient condition for strategy-proofness (in a sequential context), see List (2002b List ( , 2004 . not be able to rank all pairs of judgment sets relative to each other; in principle, our model allows studying a further relaxation of these conditions.
What preferences over collective judgment sets can we expect an individual i to hold when i's judgment set is A i ? The answer is not straightforward, and it may even be di¢ cult to say anything about i's preferences on the basis of A i alone. To illustrate this, consider …rst a single proposition p, say, "CO 2 emissions lead to global warming". If individual i judges that p (i.e., p 2 A i ), it does not necessarily follow that i wants the group to judge that p. Just imagine that i owns an oil company which bene…ts from low taxes on CO 2 emissions, and that taxes are increased if and only if the group judges that p. In general, accepting p and wanting the group to accept p are conceptually distinct (though the literature is often unclear about this distinction). Whether acceptance and desire of group acceptance happen to coincide in a particular case is an empirical question. 24 There are important situations in which the two may indeed be reasonably expected to coincide. An important example is that of epistemically motivated individuals: here each individual prefers group judgments that she considers closer to the truth, where she may consider her own judgments as the truth. A non-epistemically motivated individual prefers judgment sets for reasons other than the truth, for example because she personally bene…ts from group actions resulting from the collective endorsement of some judgment sets rather than others. 25 We now give examples of possible assumptions (empirical claims) on how the individuals'preferences are related to their judgment sets. Which of these assumptions is correct depends on the group of individuals and the aggregation problem in question. Di¤erent assumptions capture di¤erent motivations of the individuals, as illustrated above. Speci…cally, the assumption of "unrestricted" preferences captures the case where an individual's preferences are not in any systematic way linked to her judgments; the assumption of "top-respecting" preferences and the stronger one of 2 4 This argument identi…es accepting with believing, thus interpreting judgment sets as (binary) belief sets, and judgment aggregation as the aggregation of (binary) belief sets into group belief sets. Although this interpretation is standard, other interpretations are possible. If accepting means desiring, judgment aggregation is the aggregation of (binary) desire sets into group desire sets. It is then more plausible that i wants the group to accept (desire) the propositions that i accepts (desires). 2 5 Even non-epistemically motivated individuals may sometimes prefer group judgments that match their own individual judgments. Suppose each individual is motivated by her desires over outcomes of group actions, which depend on the state of the world. Suppose, further, all individuals hold the same desires over outcomes but di¤erent beliefs about the state of the world, and each individual is convinced that her own beliefs are true and that their collective acceptance would lead to the desired outcomes. Such individuals may want the group judgments to match their individual judgments, but mainly to satisfy their desires over outcomes rather than to bring about true group beliefs.
"closeness-respecting"preferences capture situations in which agents would like group judgments to agree with their own judgments. We use a function C that assigns to each possible judgment set A i a non-empty set C(A i ) of (re ‡exive and transitive) preference relations that are considered "compatible" with A i (i.e., possible given A i ). Our examples of preference assumptions can be stated formally as follows (in increasing order of strength).
Unrestricted preferences. For each
is the set of all preference relations % (regardless of A i ).
Top-respecting preferences. For each A i , C(A i ) is the set of all preference relations % for which A i is a most preferred judgment set, i.e., C(A i ) = f%: A i % B for all judgment sets Bg.
To de…ne "closeness-respecting" preferences, we say that a judgment set B is at 
Closeness-respecting preferences on Y (for some Y X). For each
the set of all preference relations % that respect closeness to A i on Y , and we write
In the important case Y = X, we drop the reference "on Y "and speak of closenessrespecting preferences simpliciter. One element of C X (A i ) is the (complete) preference relation induced by the Hamming distance to A i . 27 Below we analyse the important cases of "reason-oriented" and "outcome-oriented" preferences, where Y is given by particular subsets of X.
2 6 In fact, it is "closer", where "closer than" is the strong component of "at least as close as". preference relation over judgment sets (each representing a preference ordering over the option set K) represents a meta-preference over preference orderings. Bossert and Storcken (1992) use the Kemeny distance between preference orderings to obtain such a meta-preference. For related work on distances between preferences and theories, see Baigent (1987) and Schulte (2005), respectively.
A strategy-proofness condition
Given a speci…cation of the function C, an aggregation rule is strategy-proof for C if, for any pro…le, any individual and any preference relation compatible with the individual's judgment set (according to C), the individual (weakly) prefers the outcome of expressing her judgment set truthfully to any outcome that would result from misrepresenting her judgment set.
Strategy-proofness for C. If the aggregation rule F has the universal domain, then strategy-proofness implies that truthfulness is a weakly dominant strategy for every individual. 29 Our de…nition of strategy-proofness (generalizing List 2002b (generalizing List , 2004 ) is similar to Gibbard's (1973) and Satterthwaite's (1975) classical one and related to other de…nitions of strategyproofness in the literature on preference aggregation (particularly, for C X , those by Barberà et al. 1993 and Nehring and Puppe 2002 , employing the notion of generalized single-peaked preferences).
As in the case of non-manipulability above, we have de…ned a family of strategyproofness conditions, one for each speci…cation of C. This means that di¤erent motivational assumptions about the individuals lead to di¤erent strategy-proofness conditions. If individuals have very restrictive preferences over possible judgment sets, then strategy-proofness is easier to achieve than if their preferences are largely unrestricted. Formally, if two functions C 1 and C 2 are such that C 1 C 2 (i.e., for
, then strategy-proofness for C 1 is less demanding than (i.e., implied by) strategy-proofness for C 2 . The more preference relations are compatible with each individual judgment set, the more demanding is the corresponding requirement of strategy-proofness.
2 8 Our de…nition of strategy-proofness can be generalized by admitting a di¤erent function Ci for each individual i. This removes a homogeneity assumption, whereby, if individuals i and j hold the same judgment set Ai = Aj, then their preference relations fall into the same set C(Ai) = C(Aj).
The homogeneity assumption is undemanding when C(Ai) is large. 2 9 This interpretation of strategy-proofness holds for product domains. For certain subdomains of the universal domain (i.e., non-product domains), we do not have a strictly well de…ned game, but our de…nition of strategy-proofness remains applicable and can be reinterpreted as one of "conditional strategy-proofness" for non-product domains, as discussed by Saporiti and Thomé (2005) .
The equivalence of strategy-proofness and non-manipulability
What is the logical relation between non-manipulability as de…ned above and strategyproofness? We show that, if preferences are closeness-respecting (on some Y X), then an equivalence between these two concepts arises. Let X be any agenda.
Theorem 4 For each Y X, F is strategy-proof for C Y if and only if F is nonmanipulable on Y .
In other words, for any subset Y of the agenda X (including the case Y = X), strategy-proofness of an aggregation rule for closeness-respecting preferences on Y is equivalent to non-manipulability on the propositions in Y . In particular, strategy-proofness for closeness-respecting preferences simpliciter is equivalent to non-manipulability simpliciter. This also implies that, for unrestricted or toprespecting preferences, strategy-proofness is more demanding than our default condition of non-manipulability, whereas, for closeness-respecting preferences on some Y ( X, it is less demanding.
Given the equivalence result of Theorem 4, we can now state corollaries of Theorems 1 and 2 above for strategy-proofness: 30
Corollary 1 For each Y X, if F satis…es universal domain, the following conditions are equivalent: (i) F is strategy-proof for C Y ;
(ii) and (iii) are equivalent, and each implies (i).
Corollary 2 For a path-connected agenda X (e.g., a conjunctive, disjunctive or preference agenda), an aggregation rule F satis…es universal domain, collective rationality, responsiveness and strategy-proofness for C X if and only if F is a dictatorship of some individual.
Corollary 2 is a judgment aggregation analogue of Nehring and Puppe's (2002) characterization of strategy-proof social choice functions in the model of "property spaces". 31 The negative part of corollary 2 (i.e., if an aggregation rule satis…es the 3 0 Our remarks on Theorems 1 and 2 above also apply to Corollaries 1 and 2. 3 1 For compact logics, it follows from their result via Corollary 1. As noted, a disanalogy lies in the aggregation rule's di¤erent informational input. In Barberà et al. (1993 Barberà et al. ( , 1997 and Nehring and Puppe (2002) , each individual submits a preference relation, here a single judgment set. Under some conditions, judgment sets can be associated with peaks of preference relations.
conditions, then it is a dictatorship) holds not only for closeness-respecting preferences (C X ) but for any preference speci…cation C at least as broad as C X , i.e., C X C, as strategy-proofness for C then implies strategy-proofness for C X . The positive part of corollary 2 (i.e., if an aggregation rule is a dictatorship, then it satis…es the conditions) holds for any preference speci…cation C allowing only top-respecting preferences, i.e., for any C such that, if %2 C(A i ), then A i % B for all judgment sets B; otherwise a dictatorship, although non-manipulable, is not strategy-proof (to see this point, recall the example of the oil company in Section 4.1).
In summary, if the individuals' preferences over judgment sets are unrestricted, top-respecting or closeness-respecting, we obtain a negative result. Moreover, in analogy with Theorem 3 above, for atomically closed or atomic agendas, we get an impossibility result even if we weaken responsiveness to the requirement of a nonconstant aggregation rule.
Outcome-and reason-oriented preferences
As we have introduced families of strategy-proofness and non-manipulability conditions, it is interesting to consider some less demanding conditions within these families. If we demand strategy-proofness for C = C X , equivalent to non-manipulability simpliciter, this precludes all incentives for manipulation, where individuals have closeness-respecting preferences. But individual preferences may sometimes fall into a more restricted set: they may be closeness-respecting on some subset Y ( X, in which case it is su¢ cient to require strategy-proofness for C Y . As an illustration, we now apply these ideas to the case of a conjunctive (analogously disjunctive) agenda.
De…nitions
Let X be a conjunctive (or disjunctive) agenda. Two important cases of closenessrespecting preferences on Y are the following.
Outcome-oriented preferences. C = C Youtcome , where Y outcome = fcg +neg .
Reason-oriented preferences. C = C Yreason , where Y reason = fa 1 ; :::; a k g +neg .
An individual with outcome-oriented preferences cares only about achieving a collective judgment on the conclusion that matches her own judgment, regardless of the premises. Such preferences make sense if only the conclusion but not the premises have consequences the individual cares about. An individual with reason-oriented preferences cares only about achieving collective judgments on the premises that match her own judgments, regardless of the conclusion. Such preferences make sense if the individual gives primary importance to the reasons given in support of outcomes, rather than the outcomes themselves, or if the group's judgments on the premises have important consequences themselves that the individual cares about (such as setting precedents for future decisions). Proponents of a deliberative conception of democracy often argue that the motivational assumption of reason-oriented preferences is appropriate in deliberative settings (for a discussion, see Elster 1986; Goodin 1986 ). Economists, by contrast, assume that in many settings outcome-oriented preferences are the more accurate motivational assumption. Ultimately, it is an empirical question what preferences are triggered by various settings.
To illustrate, consider premise-based voting and the pro…le in Table 1 . Individual 3's judgment set is A 3 = f:a; b; :c; rg, where r = c $ (a^b). If all individuals are truthful, the collective judgment set is A = fa; b; c; rg. If individual 3 untruthfully submits A 3 = f:a; :b; :c; rg and individuals 1 and 2 are truthful, the collective judgment set is A = fa; :b; :c; rg. Now A is closer to A 3 than A on Y outcome = fcg +neg , whereas A is closer to A 3 than A on Y reason = fa; bg +neg : So, under outcomeoriented preferences, individual 3 (at least weakly) prefers A to A, whereas, under reason-oriented preferences, individual 3 (at least weakly) prefers A to A .
5.2
The strategy-proofness of premise-based voting for
reason-oriented preferences
As shown above, conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof for C X and hence also for C Yreason and C Youtcome . Premise-based voting is not strategy-proof for C X and neither for C Youtcome , as can easily be seen from our …rst example of manipulation. But the following holds. Two aggregation rules F and G with identical domain are strategically equivalent on Y X for C if, for every pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) = Domain(G) and preference relations % 1 2 C(A 1 ), : : : , % n 2 C(A n ), there exist pro…les (B 1 ; : : : ; B n ), (C 1 ; : : : ; C n ) 2 Domain(F ) = Domain(G) such that (i) for each individual i, submitting B i is a weakly dominant strategy under rule F and submitting C i is a weakly dominant strategy under rule G;
(ii) F (B 1 ; : : : ; B n ) and G(C 1 ; : : : ; C n ) agree on every proposition p 2 Y .
Theorem 5 For a conjunctive or disjunctive agenda X, premise-and conclusionbased voting are strategically equivalent on Y outcome = fcg +neg for C Youtcome .
Despite the di¤erences between premise-and conclusion-based voting, if individuals have outcome-oriented preferences and act on appropriate weakly dominant strategies, the two rules generate identical collective judgments on the conclusion. This is surprising as premise-and conclusion-based voting are regarded in the literature as two diametrically opposed aggregation rules.
Concluding remarks
As judgment aggregation problems arise in many real-world decision-making bodies, it is important to understand which judgment aggregation rules are vulnerable to manipulation and which not. We have introduced a non-manipulability condition for judgment aggregation and characterized the class of non-manipulable judgment aggregation rules. Non-manipulability rules out the existence of opportunities for manipulation by the untruthful expression of individual judgments. We have then de…ned a game-theoretic strategy-proofness condition and shown that, under some (but not all) motivational assumptions, it is equivalent to non-manipulability, as de…ned earlier. For these motivational assumptions, our characterization of nonmanipulable aggregation rules has allowed us to characterize all strategy-proof aggregation rules. Strategy-proofness rules out the existence of incentives for manipulation.
Crucially, if individuals do not generally want the group to make collective judgments that match their own individual judgments, the concepts of non-manipulability and strategy-proofness may come signi…cantly apart.
We have also proved an impossibility result that is the judgment aggregation analogue of the classical Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem on preference aggregation. For the class of path-connected agendas, including conjunctive, disjunctive and preference agendas, all non-manipulable aggregation rules satisfying some mild conditions are dictatorial. The impossibility result becomes even stronger for agendas with particularly rich logical connections between propositions.
To avoid this impossibility, we have suggested that permitting incomplete collective judgments or domain restrictions are the most promising routes. For example, conclusion-based voting is strategy-proof, but violates completeness. Another way to avoid the impossibility is to relax non-manipulability or strategy-proofness itself.
Both conditions fall into more general families of conditions of di¤erent strength. Instead of requiring non-manipulability on the entire agenda of propositions, we may require non-manipulability only on some subset of the agenda. Premise-based voting, for example, is non-manipulable on the set of premises, but not non-manipulable
simpliciter. Whether such a weaker non-manipulability condition is su¢ cient in practice depends on how worried we are about possible opportunities for manipulation on propositions outside the subset of the agenda for which non-manipulability holds.
Likewise, instead of requiring strategy-proofness for a large class of individual preferences over judgment sets, we may require strategy-proofness only for a restricted class of preferences, for example for "outcome-" or "reason-oriented" preferences.
Premise-based voting, for example, is strategy-proof for "reason-oriented" preferences. Whether such a weaker strategy-proofness condition is su¢ cient in practice depends on the motivations of the decision-makers.
Finally, we have shown that, for "outcome-oriented" preferences, premise-and conclusion-based voting are strategically equivalent. They generate the same collective judgment on the conclusion if individuals act on appropriate weakly dominant strategies.
Our results raise questions about a prominent position in the literature, according to which premise-based voting is superior to conclusion-based voting from a deliberative democracy perspective. We have shown that, with respect to non-manipulability and strategy-proofness, conclusion-based voting outperforms premise-based voting.
This result could be generalized beyond conjunctive and disjunctive agendas.
Until now, comparisons between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation have focused mainly on Condorcet's paradox and Arrow's theorem. With this paper, we hope to inspire further research on strategic voting and a game-theoretic perspective in a judgment aggregation context. An important challenge is the development of models of deliberation on interconnected propositions -where individuals not only "feed"their judgments into some aggregation rule, but where they deliberate about the propositions prior to making collective judgments -and the study of the strategic aspects of such deliberation. We leave this challenge for further work. 
A Appendix
Proof of Theorem 1. Let Y X. We prove …rst that (ii) and (iii) are equivalent, then that (ii) implies (i), and then that, given universal domain, (i) implies (ii).
(ii) implies (iii). Trivial as monotonicity on Y implies weak monotonicity on Y .
(iii) implies (ii). Suppose F is independent on Y and weakly monotonic on Y .
To show monotonicity on Y , note that in the requirement de…ning weak monotonicity on Y one may, by independence on Y , replace "for some such pair" by "for all such pairs". The modi…ed requirement is equivalent to monotonicity on Y . To show independence on Y , consider any proposition p 2 Y and pro…les (A 1 ; :::; A n );
(A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) such that, for all individuals i; A i and A i agree on p:
We have to show that F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) and F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) agree on p: Starting with the pro…le (A 1 ; :::; A n ); we replace …rst A 1 by A 1 ; then A 2 by A 2 ; ..., then A n by A n :
By universal domain, each replacement leads to a pro…le still in Domain(F ). We now show that each replacement preserves the collective judgment about p: Assume for contradiction that for individual i replacement of A i by A i changes the collective judgment about p: Since A i and A i agree on p but the respective outcomes for A i and for A i disagree on p; either A i or A i (but not both) disagrees with the respective outcome. This is a contradiction, since it allows individual i to manipulate: in the …rst case by submitting A i with genuine judgment set A i ; in the second case by submitting A i with genuine judgment set A i . Since no replacement has changed the collective judgment about p; it follows that F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) and F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) agree on p; which proves independence on Y .
For any propositions p; q, we write p q to mean that p conditionally entails q.
Proof that conjunctive and disjunctive agendas are path-connected. Let X be the conjunctive agenda X = fa 1 ; :a 1 ; :::; a k ; :a k ; c; :c; r; :rg, where k 1 and r is the connection rule c $ (a 1^: ::^a k ). (The proof for a disjunctive agenda is analogous.)
We have to show that for any p; q 2 X there is a sequence p = p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p k = q in X (k 1) such that p 1 p 2 ; p 2 p 3 ; :::; p k 1 p k . To show this, it is su¢ cient to prove that p q for any propositions p; q 2 X of di¤ erent types,
where a proposition is of type 1 if it is a possibly negated premise (a 1 ; :a 1 ; :::; a k ;
:a k ), of type 2 if it is the possibly negated conclusion (c; :c) and of type 3 if it is the possibly negated connection rule (r; :r). The reason is (in short) that, if (1) holds, then, for any p; q 2 X of the same type, taking any s 2 X of a di¤erent type, there is by (1) a path connecting p to s and a path connecting s to q; the concatenation of both paths connects p to q, as desired. As p q if and only if :q :p (use both times the same Y ), claim (1) is equivalent to p q for any propositions p; q 2 X such that p has smaller type than q.
We show (2) by going through the di¤erent cases (where j 2 f1; :::; kg):
From type 2 to type 3 : we have c r and :c :r (take Y = fa 1 ; :::; a k g both times), and c :r and :c r (take Y = f:a 1 g both times).
From type 1 to type 2 : we have a j c and :a j :c (take Y = fr; a 1 ; :::; a j 1 ; a j+1 ; :::; a k g both times), and a j :c and :a j c (take Y = f:r; a 1 ; :::; a j 1 ; a j+1 ;
:::; a k g both times);
From type 1 to type 3 : we have a j r and :a j :r (take Y = fc; a 1 ; :::; a j 1 ; a j+1 ; :::; a k g both times), and a j :r and :a j r (take Y = f:c; a 1 ; :::; a j 1 ; a j+1 ;
:::; a k g both times).
Proof of Theorem 2. Let X be path-connected. If F is dictatorial, it obviously satis…es universal domain, collective rationality, responsiveness and non-manipulability.
Now suppose F has all these properties, hence is also independent and monotonic by Theorem 1. We show that F is dictatorial. If X contains no contingent proposition, F is trivially dictatorial (where each individual is a dictator). From now on, suppose X is not of this degenerate type. For any consistent set Z X; let A Z be some consistent and complete judgment set such that Z A Z (which exists by L1-L3).
Claim 1. F satis…es the unanimity principle: for any p 2 X and any (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2
Consider any p 2 X and (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) such that p 2 A i for every i. Since the sets A i are consistent, p is consistent. If :p is inconsistent (i.e., p is a tautology), p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) by collective rationality. Now suppose :p is consistent.
As each of p; :p is consistent, p is contingent. So, by responsiveness, there exists a pro…le (B 1 ; :::; B n ) 2 Domain(F ) such that p 2 F (B 1 ; :::; B n ). In (B 1 ; :::; B n ) we now replace one by one each judgment set B i by A i , until we obtain the pro…le (A 1 ; :::; A n ).
Each replacement preserves the collective acceptance of p, either by monotonicity (if p = 2 B i ) or by independence (if p 2 B i ). So p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ), as desired.
Claim 2. F is systematic: there exists a set W of ("winning") coalitions C N such that, for every (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ), F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) = fp 2 X : fi : p 2
For each contingent p 2 X, let W p be the set all subsets C N such that p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) for some (hence by independence any) (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F )
Consider any contingent p; q 2 X. We prove that W p = W q .
Suppose C 2 W p , and let us show that C 2 W q ; this proves the inclusion W q W p , and the converse inclusion can be shown analogously. As X is path-connected, there are p = p 1 ; p 2 ; :::; p k = q 2 X with p 1 p 2 , p 2 p 3 , ..., p k 1 p k . We show by induction that C 2 W p j for all j = 1; 2; :::; k. If j = 1 then C 2 C p 1 by p 1 = p. Now let 1 j < k and assume C 2 W p j . Part (1) follows from claim 1. Regarding parts (2) and (3), note that, for any C N , there exists a p 2 X and an (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) with fi : p 2 A i g = C; this holds because X contains a contingent proposition p. Part (2) holds because, for any (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ), each of the sets A 1 ; :::; A n ; F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) contains exactly one member of any pair p; :p 2 X, by universal domain and collective rationality.
Part (3) follows from a repeated application of monotonicity and universal domain.
Claim 4. There exists an inconsistent set Y X with pairwise disjoint subsets
j is consistent for any j 2 f1; 2; 3g. Here, Z : := f:p : p 2 Zg for any Z X. Consider any C; C 2 W, and assume for contradiction that C 1 := C \ C = 2 W.
Put C 2 := C nC and C 3 := N nC . Let Y; Z 1 ; Z 2 ; Z 3 be as in claim 4. Noting that C 1 ; C 2 ; C 3 form a partition of N , we de…ne the pro…le (A 1 ; :::; A n ) by: Claim 6. There is a dictator.
Consider the intersection of all winning coalitions, e C := \ C2W C: By claim 5, e C 2 W. So e C 6 = ;, as by claim 3, ; = 2 W. Hence there is a j 2 e C: To show that j is a dictator, consider any (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) and p 2 X, and let us prove that p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) if and only if p 2 A j . If p 2 F (A 1 ; :::; A n ) then C := fi : p 2 A i g 2 W, whence j 2 C (as j belongs to every winning coalition), i.e., Proof of Proposition 1. We prove this result directly, although it can also be derived from Corollary 1. Let F be premise-based voting. To show that F is strategyproof for C Yreason , consider any individual i; pro…le (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ); ivariant (A 1 ; : : : ; A i ; : : : ; A n ) 2 Domain(F ); and preference relation % i 2 C Yreason (A i ):
The de…nition of premise-based voting implies that F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) is at least as close to A i as F (A 1 ; : : : ; A i ; : : : ; A n ) on Y reason . So, by % i 2 C Yreason (A i ), we have F (A 1 ; : : : ; A n ) % i F (A 1 ; : : : ; A i ; : : : ; A n ).
Proof of Theorem 5. Consider the conjunctive agenda (the proof is analogous for disjunctive agendas). Let F and G be premise-and conclusion-based voting, respectively. Take any pro…le (A 1 ; :::; A n ) 2 Domain(F ) = Domain(G) and any preference relations % 1 2 C Youtcome (A 1 ), :::, % n 2 C Youtcome (A n ). ant strategy for each i under F . Second, let (C 1 ; : : : ; C n ) be (A 1 ; :::; A n ) (the truthful pro…le). Then, for each i, submitting C i is a weakly dominant strategy under G, as G is strategy-proof. Finally, it can easily be seen that F (B 1 ; : : : ; B n ) and G(C 1 ; : : : ; C n ) = G(A 1 ; :::; A n ) agree on each proposition in Y outcome = fc; :cg.
